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Belser: Statutory Construction

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CLINCH HEYWARD BELSER*

Several cases decided during the period covered by this
survey illustrate the application of established principles of
statutory construction to interesting situations.
In Roper v. South CarolinaTax Commission' the Supreme
Court held that a dividend of preferred stock was "income",
within the meaning of the Income Tax Act of 19262 to the
owner of the common stock of the corporation where the
owner held all the common stock and only common stock was
outstanding. In reaching that decision the Court painstakingly analyzed the history of state and federal law on the
point and carefully applied principles of statutory construction. The taxpayer contended, and the Court apparently accepted his view, that at the time of the enactment of the 1926
Act the dividend in question would not have been income
under the federal tax statute enacted in 1921. The taxpayer
therefore urged acceptance of the doctrine that where the
language of a statute is substantially identical with an earlier
statute of another state, a presumption arises that judicial
construction placed upon the earlier statute is to be applied
to the later statute. 3 Application of this principle would cause
the state law passed in 1926 to be construed as the federal
law if the statutes were substantially identical. The Court
determined that the statutes were not substantially identical
because the federal statute (Revenue Act of 1921) contained
a provision, "A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax
...", which did not appear in our 1926 Act. Furthermore,
a provision in the 1922 tax law of this state which specifically
made the federal law (statutes and regulations) applicable to
our state law had been, together with the rest of the act,
fully and completely repealed by the 1926 Act. By refusing
to adopt the federal law exempting stock dividends from taxation, said the Court, the Legislature evidenced an intention
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1. 231 S. C. 587, 99 S.E. 2d 377 (1957).
2. CODE OF LAwS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 65-201 et seq.
3. Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935) ; Fuller v.
Tax Commission, 128 S. C. 14, 121 S.E. 478 (1924).
4.42 STAT.227 § 201 (d) (1921).
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to tax a preferred stock dividend as income. In concluding
the Court stated that the word "income" in a tax statute was
to be used in the ordinary sense of gain or profit,5 and that
a "preferred stock" dividend as ordinarily understood (the

record was bare as to the specifications of the subject stock)
constituted such a gain or profit. The Court also adverted

to the principle that the construction placed upon the act
by the Tax Commission was entitled to most respectful consideration and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.6
In a case presenting an involved economic situation, Wal-

lace v. Wannamaker,7 the Court relied in part upon the wellestablished principle that a statutory provision which works
a forfeiture or inflicts a penalty must be strictly construed.
An agreement providing for the lease of certain land for
fifteen years required the tenant to erect a service station and
to pay rent based on products sold at the station but required
the landlord to reimburse the tenant for the cost of the improvements by assigning to the tenant all rent due until the
the improvement account was repaid. A dispute arose as to
the amount to be credited to the improvement account by
way of rent. The landlord brought ejectment proceedings
under section 41-101 of the 1952 Code on the ground that the
tenant had failed "to pay the rent when due". The improvement account was not yet paid in full and would not have
been paid up even allowing maximum credit contended for
by the landlord. The Court held that the failure of the tenant
to give credit (a jury had found for the landlord on the issue
as to the credit) did not amount to a failure "to pay rent",
saying that the ejectment proceedings were purely statutory
and to eject the tenant would work as a "forfeiture" of the
lease.

One other case requires brief comment. In City of Green-

ville v. GreaterGreenville Sewer District8 the Court construed
local legislation to determine which of the parties should pay
for certain "lateral" sewer lines. The Court relied in part
upon construction of legislation not quoted in the decision, and

the opinion does not reveal any noteworthy principles of law.
5. Southern Weaving Co. v. Query, 206 S. C. 307, 34 S. E. 2d 51
(1945); Beard v. S. C. Tax Commission, 230 S. C. 357, 95 S. E. 2d 628
'6.

Asmer v. Livingston, 225 S. C. 341, 82 S. E. 2d 465 (1954).
'7. 2131 S. C. 158, 97 S. E. 2d 502 (1957).
8. 232 S. C. 472, 102 S.E. 2d 524 (1958).
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